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BOOK REVIEW
Identity as Inclusion
JEROME BRUNERt
RIGHTS OF INCLUSION: LAW AND IDENTITY IN THE LIFE
STORIES OF AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES. By David M.
Engel and Frank W. Munger. University of Chicago Press,
2003. Pp. 272. $19.00.
This intriguing book is best read with several
perspectives in mind. From a lawyerly point of view it is a
book about rights-about the rights of the disabled to be
included in the society of the employed as required by the
1990 Americans with Disabilities Act,' the ADA as it is
popularly called. But to leave it at that would be akin to
describing Moby Dick2 as a book about a whale! For what
David Engel and Frank Munger have offered us is a fresh
and humane look at the doctrine of rights itself, both as a
cultural concept and a legal doctrine. Indeed, the authors
mostly steer clear of litigation and court holdings and deal
principally with the impact of disability rights on the lives
of the disabled-especially the impact (mostly indirect) of
the ADA. Their inquiry, in fact, is based principally upon
lengthy interviews with sixty disabled Americans with
whom they discussed the vicissitudes and opportunities
created by their disabilities in their personal as well as in
their working lives.
t University Professor, New York University School of Law.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12217.
2. HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY-DICK; OR THE WHALE (Arion Press 1979)
(1851).
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The book's first conclusion, admittedly puzzling, is that
while virtually all those interviewed were affected by the
ADA, not a single one of them ever brought suit under its
terms, or indeed ever invoked it in dealing with disability-
resistant employers, potential or actual. But perhaps this is
not so puzzling, after all. For surely the impact of law on
everyday life is rarely ever confrontational. Rather, the law
impacts on life indirectly, seldom requiring the face-off of
litigation. So how then do "rights" come into the lives of the
disabled?
The authors confess early on that their inquiry grew
"out of an ... inconsistency in two views of law and society
in America at the turn of the new century. One view
emphasizes the centrality of rights. It sees rights as a
defining characteristic of American citizenship and an
indispensable guarantee of 'life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness.' 3 But there is another view that argues (to
paraphrase Marc Galanter) that legal rights are seldom
invoked by Americans who, more typically, usually tolerate
or absorb perceived wrongs without overt response and
most usually without consulting a lawyer or going to court. 4
America, on this view, is a nation of "law avoiders."
The French have an ironic expression: "les extremes se
touchent." And surely the practice of American civil rights
where the disabled are concerned provides a striking
example of two seemingly opposite approaches living side
by side: Rights are "guaranteed," yet, as the authors
remark, those very rights are "among the least invoked of
all laws" though "[t]hey concern themselves not only with
the legal interests of those who belong to civil society but
also with the issue of membership itself."5 That, of course,
may be the reason why rights are rarely invoked in court
actions-but more of that presently. In any case, the legal
invocation of civil rights remains "highly problematic" even
when the rights relate to such seemingly unproblematic and
3. DAVID M. ENGEL & FRANK W. MUNGER, RIGHTS OF INCLUSION: LAW AND
IDENTITY IN THE LIFE STORIES OF AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES 2 (2003)
[hereinafter RIGHTS OF INCLUSION].
4. Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and
Don't Know (and Think We Know) about Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious
Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4 (1983).
5. RIGHTS OF INCLUSION, supra note 3, at 3.
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non-ideological matters as age and disability, leaving aside
thornier matters such as race, gender, and sexual
orientation. So why are we so uptight about enforcing civil
rights, even though we proclaim their quintessential
"Americanness" in the very opening paragraph of our
Constitution?
Surely not through absent-minded inattention! The
voting rights of women surely did not go unnoticed for a
century and a half before the Nineteenth Amendment, nor
were we looking the other way in the half century between
Brown v. Board of Education6 and Plessy v. Ferguson?7 So,
how did we manage to overlook the plight of the disabled
until 1990? After all, disabilities are scarcely invisible: The
estimated number of physically or mentally disabled
Americans ranges from 25 to 60 million with the
Congressional estimate at 43 million in 1990 when the ADA
became law.8
The first hurdle in protecting the rights of the disabled
was to get America to notice that they had rights and that
those rights were not being properly protected, a task of
''consciousness raising," to revive an appropriate expression
from the 1960s. We know all too well that such
consciousness raising involves more than just bringing
something to somebody's attention. It requires as well
getting people to stop ignoring something they would rather
not hear about, overcoming entrenched inattention. So how
did the ADA go about doing that?
Its first step was to make matters explicit, to make
alive again what had previously been deadened by being
"taken for granted." It took as its major and detailed aim to
eliminate the "major areas of discrimination faced day-to-
day by people with disabilities."9 Title I specifically
prohibits not only discrimination in hiring but also any
failure to provide "reasonable accommodations" to a
disabled person who is otherwise qualified. 10 And that
6. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
7. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
8. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1).
9. Id. § 12101(b)(4) (emphasis added).
10. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
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includes "making existing facilities ... readily accessible" 11
as well as restructuring work routines and schedules,
modifying equipment if necessary, and even providing
"appropriate" qualifying examinations for employment
candidates. 12 Its aim, in a word, was to bring the
employment of the disabled into the realm of the quotidian
and the possible.
Providing, of course, that the necessary measures for
doing so do not impose "undue hardship" on an employer. 13
And our authors note wryly that neither "undue hardship"
for the employer nor "reasonable accommodations" for the
disabled employee lend themselves to strict and easily
enforceable definition! 14
Yet, despite such ambiguities, the ADA has proved to be
an effective extension of the rights paradigm to problems of
the disabled-even if it has been rarely invoked in law
suits. Indeed, most observers agree that it has even
changed the cultural climate in which the disabled must
live.
Little wonder, then, that our authors decided to extend
their inquiry beyond the usual "legal impact" analysis. They
wisely decided to explore "how newly enacted civil rights,
such as those in the ADA, become interwoven with the life
histories and the legal consciousness of individuals who
might assert them."'15 And it was with this aim in view that
they conducted their interviews, making every possible
effort to assure that their interviewees were
"representative," though there were only sixty of them. Half
were physically disabled and confined to wheel chairs, the
other half disabled by learning disabilities (principally
dyslexia); half were women, the rest men; a third were high
school seniors just starting their work lives, another third
in their early twenties at an early stage in their careers,
and a last third were in mid-life. They ranged from lawyers
to manual workers.
11. Id. § 12111(9)(A).
12. Id. § 12111(9)(B).
13. Id. § 12111(10)(B).
14. See RIGHTS OF INCLUSION, supra note 3, at 121, 155.
15. Id. at 7.
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The authors' approach to interviewing was open-ended,
in keeping with their general quest:
[W]e invited the interviewees to use their own language to
describe their life histories, beginning with early childhood
experiences, and including recollections of family and early
education, the onset or diagnosis of disability, the formation of
ideas about careers and adult life, influential mentors, job
training, early work experience, problems, conflicts, and
achievements. 16
Legal issues (and the ADA specifically) were not
brought up until the very end of the interview (unless
interviewees brought them up themselves).
The book's basic thesis-perhaps its main conclusion
too-is best put in the authors' own words:
Rights can transform the sense of self simply by increasing
individuals' perception of their own worth, or by reminding them
of opportunities they could pursue if they could assume reasonable
accommodations and nondiscriminatory behavior by employers. 17
So how do rights-guaranteeing laws manage this
miracle, how do they get "inside" the psyches of the
disabled-even into the psyches of their potential and
actual employers and their coworkers?
Well, the first conclusion is that the miracle reveals
itself in many different guises, often quite indirectly. And,
as already noted, it is rarely effected by a law suit invoking
the ADA, or even by threatening employers with the Act's
powers. The ADA, rather, seems to have served as a
catalyst, reversing "the historically sanctioned process of
defining jobs in terms of prepackaged sets of tasks and in
terms of the ideal worker who can perform those tasks
according to routines specified by the employer."18 It is by
this means that it has changed the cultural landscape of
work for the disabled.
To appreciate this change, we need to have a closer look
at what rights struggles are usually assumed to be about.
16. Id. at 8.
17. Id. at 11.
18. Id. at 17.
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Virtually any struggle for rights, in the classic view, pits a
class of individuals who aspire for some rare resource
against others who believe themselves to have a legitimized
or a taken-for-granted right to that same resource. That is
the bare knuckles of it. Presumably, it is the function of a
system of laws to devise means for preventing or
adjudicating such face-offs.
Yet we know that to rely exclusively on a system of laws
to accomplish this end would surely be futile, for Equal
Protection Clauses and Bills of Rights do not operate in a
cultural vacuum. For if a system of laws is to be effective, it
must somehow be congruent with a people's way of thinking
and feeling and resolving differences. As H.L.A. Hart once
put it, laws do not succeed when they leave those affected
feeling "strangers" to it.19 Laws, somehow, must be in
keeping with our identities as individuals-they must be
our laws.
Returning now to Engel and Munger, they properly
remind us that the disabled, like the rest of us, must also
create their own identities, the "Selves" at the center of
their subjectivity. But Identities are created not just from
the inside out, autochthonously. One's identity also grows
out of one's relations with family, friends, colleagues,
community, and employers. And this creates a special
problem for the disabled in view of the obvious fact that
one's disability has a strong effect on how others view him
or her. Being taken as helplessly and irreparably disabled
is bound to diminish and demean one's identity.
One's identity, of course, develops and alters over time.
Whether disabled or not, we continue to elaborate and
nourish our selfhood, and do so principally through
narrative-through stories we tell ourselves about our lives,
past, present and future. 20 For though our "Selves" may be
at the center of our stories, "Others" are there as well,
members of the cast of characters in our life stories. As our
authors neatly sum it up, "The interactive process of
identity formation shapes a sense of self that is consistent
with inclusion or exclusion in mainstream society. ' 21 This
19. H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).
20. See, e.g., JEROME BRUNER, MAKING STORIES: LAW, LITERATURE, LIFE
(2002).
21. RIGHTS OF INCLUSION, supra note 3, at 44.
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"dialectic of telling and living life" provides a "space" within
us for those others that we relate to, live with, grow up
with, work next to.
As our authors put it, identity formation and narrative
are what shape our lives-and often misshape the lives of
the disabled. If an ADA is to be effective, it must achieve its
ends by affecting both these processes. For the disabled, the
critical question is the extent to which disability
overshadows other elements of their identity. If a disabled
person falls victim to such "overshadowing," he or she no
longer has the "space" in which legally assured disability
rights can become active. Under such circumstances, they
even lose the will to recognize that they have "rights" or
that they have been deprived of them. Losing the will to tell
stories even robs them of the means for exploring
possibilities in the present or the future.
Add one other element: stigma. There is something
about seeing oneself as irreparably disabled that (at least in
the mind of the disabled) sets one apart. As Robert Murphy,
a gifted anthropologist who became quadriplegic, put it:
"We are subverters of an American ideal, just as the poor
are betrayers of the American Dream. And to the extent
that we depart from the ideal, we become ugly and
repulsive to the able-bodied. People recoil from us .... ,,22 In
the end, and lacking positive assist, the disabled come to
feel themselves as "liminal.'' 23 As Murphy puts it, "eyes are
averted and people take care not to approach wheelchairs
too closely. '24
Yet, what is so movingly apparent in the book's lengthy
autobiographical interviews (and especially in the
comments that disabled interviewees offered when they
were given an opportunity to read transcripts of what they
had said) is that there are indeed many, many ways in
which the disabled can be helped, kept from being
overwhelmed and liminalized by their disabilities. Despite
adversity, the coping disabled manage to nurture their
identities and extend their life narratives. And the process
continues through their whole lives. For, as the authors put
22. Id. at 53 (quoting ROBERT F. MURPHY, THE BODY SILENT 116-17 (1987)).
23. Id.
24. Id. (quoting MURPHY, supra note 22, at 135).
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it, identity formation is recursive-"not only does identity
determine how and when rights become active, but rights
can also shape identity. ' 25 For those who do not succumb to
hopelessness, rights go on enriching their self-perception,
enabling them to envision more ambitious career paths. It
is the very existence of the ADA that seems to help in this
subtle process.
Engel and Munger note two sets of circumstances that
affect an individual's capacity to engage in social
interactions or to narrate their life stories in ways that are
likely to enhance or diminish the role of rights. First among
these are the personal attributes of the disabled person
himself or herself: Resiliency, ambition, perseverance,
creativity, congeniality, and courage, or whatever it is that
makes it possible for a disabled person to form and keep an
identity that is not dominated by a sense of disablement.
Fear of stigmatization, of course, is the enemy of all these
desirable traits. When a disability is invisible, as with
dyslexia, the "option to conceal" can undo the benefits given
by ADA rights. Yet, it is also the case that some wheelchair
users are made to feel too visible and simply withdraw.
But equally important are the social circumstances of
the disabled person. Yes, family matters greatly, as do race,
class, and gender. But the authors wisely warn us away
from overly deterministic or reductionist conclusions. For,
indeed, the interviews reveal again and again that family,
class, race, and gender do matter, but always in some
highly particular way. They matter principally by
restricting or enriching the "discourses" to which the
disabled have access. And these discourses are often
idiosyncratic: They may be organized around issues of
racial justice, or "free market" access, or religious faith, any
of which may give the disabled confidence and heightened
awareness of their rights. One of the most touchingly ironic
interviews, for example, was with a disabled man who
disapproved of "government intervention" (like the ADA) as
politically insupportable-yet gained courage from his
contrary conviction that each person must operate on their
own!
Another circumstance in all this is sheer timing-the
when of an accident, or of a diagnosis, or of the recognition
25. Id. at 242.
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of disability. For one woman, early onset of her physical
disability meant that she benefited from a long period of
preparation for self-sufficiency in a middle class family. She
finally achieved a professional career. For another, a man
whose disability came later, he was able to draw on his
existing professional credentials and connections to lift him
over his crisis.26 Yet, there are also interviews with people
who were effectively isolated by early onset, as well as those
who were smashed by a late onset, feeling they had been
irreversibly thrown off their familiar course.
The learning disabled, by the way, were somewhat
different from those who were wheelchair-bound, perhaps
because dyslexia and other learning difficulties have only
begun to be understood and differentiated from mere
"backwardness" or "laziness." More likely, it is that such
disabilities are thought of as "mental" and therefore given
somewhat shorter shrift. Or perhaps it is that they have to
be detected earlier for effective rehabilitation.
I wish our authors had said more about the wider
responsibilities that the community could undertake on
behalf of the disabled, particularly where learning
disabilities are concerned. Their interviewees often have
devastating things to say about their experience in "special
education" classes for the learning disabled and, by general
agreement, their quality varies widely. Surely, more could
be done in that sphere. But when the motive for reducing
school expenditures is to reduce taxes, it is almost
inevitable that education for the learning disabled will be
among the first to suffer.
Return finally to legal issues and "legal consciousness."
Our authors say, "We do not dispute the importance of...
[legal] doctrinal battles, but we think they provide an
extremely limited and at times distorted picture of the
difference the ADA has made. ' 27 They take the view that a
much broader, individually oriented approach is needed if
we are to appreciate the full benefits of the ADA. It is the
"context-creating effects" of rights laws that matter,
particularly their effectiveness in providing the disabled
with a sense of inclusion in the broader society. For it is this
sense of inclusion that keeps us on our way toward an
26. Id. at 198-202.
27. RIGHTS OF INCLUSION, supra note 3, at 250.
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uncrippled identity, and keeps alive the will to make stories
for ourselves about new and promising possibilities.
But one cannot resist asking, when all is said and done,
whether Engel and Munger have fully recognized the
reverberating power of such rights legislation as the ADA.
Granted, many of their disabled interviewees never so
much as mention the ADA in their stories. But perhaps our
authors underestimate how strong a background part the
Act played in their interviewees' appraisal of their
employment chances. Knowing it was "there" makes a
difference. Just as knowing Brown v. Board of Education28
was "there" made a difference to local school boards and
local petitioners negotiating local problems. And so too with
sex discrimination laws: Employers learn to keep in mind
that they are "there" when the next round of promotions
comes due.
Statutes and court holdings have powerful, indirect,
and often concealed ways of resolving problems and
dilemmas that exist in any society. Let me offer an
example. Anthony Amsterdam and I have argued that
American society seems always hung up between two
rather contradictory value orientations-what we called
The American Creed and The American Caution: Give
everybody an equal chance, but watch out for those who
might take advantage of it.29 And so with the ADA: Give the
disabled their chance at a job, but only if it does not create
"undue hardship" for the employer. So the ADA helps swing
the balance toward more ingenuity about "reasonable
accommodations" and less patience with employers' "undue
hardship" claims. Laws and court holdings, however seldom
they may provoke or encourage litigation, do have subtle
ways of changing our ways of looking at the world.
Americans may indeed be "law avoiders," but they are not
insensitive to the legal climate.
Let me end with a quibble. Despite the ADA's
admittedly good effects, Engel and Munger are very far
from concluding that we in America are now launched upon
a continual evolution toward greater rights consciousness
where the disabled are concerned. "Our interviewees report
28. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
29. See ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW
(2000).
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that the ADA's employment rights have been neither
uniformly beneficial nor uniformly harmful. Instead, the
effects have varied dramatically and are dependent far less
on the formal qualities of the law than on the evolving
identities of its beneficiaries and the social circumstances of
their lives."3 0 I found myself somewhat puzzled by this
point. I finally concluded that they meant, simply, that the
ADA had not solved all the problems that beset the
disabled. Does any law ever solve all the problems that
have accrued over the years-indeed centuries-before its
passage? Particularly such subtle problems as identity
formation? Law too is a "recursive" process, to use the
authors' favorite term. Its task is to alter prevailing
conditions so that we may develop a better sense of what is
needed next. I apologize for this final quibble and bring it
up principally to express my agreement with the authors'
assessment of the ADA's general success, but also to remind
them that long-neglected problems take more than a single
legislative Act to be resolved-particularly problems as
deeply personal as those of the disabled.
30. RIGHTS OF INCLUSION, supra note 3, at 245.
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